Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing is a unique form of financing that is allowed to firms filing under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. The legal provisions confer enhanced seniority on this financing. It is argued that such financing leads to excessive investment in risky, (even negative NPV) projects. Defenders of DIP financing, on the other hand, argue that it allows funding for positive NPV projects. We examine this issue empirically. Using a large sample of bankruptcy filings, we find little evidence of systematic overinvestment by firms that obtain DIP financing. The firms receiving DIP financing are more likely to emerge successfully and, on average, spend a shorter time in bankruptcy reorganization than the firms that do not receive such financing. Further, we find that relationships are important. In particular, when a lender with a prior lending relationship with the borrower is also the DIP lender, it is more likely to finance smaller firms. These firms also have a significantly shorter reorganization period than firms that secure DIP financing from a new lender. Our results suggest a positive role for DIP financing, which is strengthened when it is combined with a prior lending relationship with the firm.
Introduction
The US Bankruptcy Code enables a financially distressed firm to restructure its financial and operational base b y filing a petition to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Code.
To facilitate funding for a firm attempting such reorganization, the Bankruptcy Code allows for a special kind of financing, which is referred to as
Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing. D IP financing is subject to formal court approval and is governed by Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Code offers superior seniority and enhanced security to the DIP creditor as an incentive to lend to a firm that otherwise would not be able to attract financing.
Although DIP financing has been available since the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, it was in the early 1990's that DIP lending grew in size and importance. DIP financing has come to play an increasingly important role in the reorganization process of financially distressed firms, yet there is remarkably little work that has examined it in detail. DIP financing is an extreme case of secured, senior financing.
There is a large and growing debate in the law and economics literature about the merits and drawbacks of senior, secured financing in general and DIP financing in particular. The controversy is centered on whether DIP financing provides perverse incentives to the shareholder-aligned managers to undertake risky and at times negative N PV projects (overinvestment problem) 1 or whether it helps the debtor undertake positive NPV projects that may be passed up in absence of senior secured credit such as DIP financing.
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To help address this controversy, and to shed light on the dynamics of DIP financing, we address the following specific questions: (i) What distinguishes the firms that obtain DIP financing from the ones that do not receive this financing? ;
1 The risk-shifting effect is analyzed in detail by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) and Triantis (1993) discuss the investment incentives to overinvest created by DIP financing in particular. 2 Stulz and Johnson (1985) provide a theoretical framework where they show that certain positive NPV projects would be undertaken only if the firm is able to finance them by secured credit.
(ii) How is DIP financing related to the probability and speed of bankruptcy resolution; and, (iii) What is the role of prior lending relationships in DIP financing?
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first empirical evaluation of these issues.
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It is commonly argued that DIP financing is largely concerned with recovery rates in the event of liquidation. 4 Since a DIP financier gets the superpriority status on the borrower's assets, she may have little incentive to screen a borrower for its ability to survive the reorganization process. In this case the DIP lender is likely to focus only on the size and availability of collateral that the borrower has available. Many in the law and economics literature (see, for example, Kanda and Levmore, 1994 and Bebchuck and Fried, 1996) have argued that secured, senior credit such as DIP financing enables equity holders in financially distressed firms to undertake riskier, even negative NPV projects, and expropriate wealth from the firm's other creditors.
However, an alternate hypothesis is that DIP financiers have an informational-based role, and fund positive NPV projects. The latter hypothesis would be consistent with the view that DIP lending is not entirely risk free. In particular, even though the DIP loans enjoy enhanced security, the DIP lender still faces some risk of loss if the borrower fails to reorganize successfully, as the eventual liquidation may not generate sufficient value to pay off the DIP lender.
To test these competing hypotheses we gather a large and comprehensive sample of over 500 firms that filed for Chapter 11, and the details of any DIP financing that they obtained. Our results show that the larger firms are more likely to obtain DIP financing. This is consistent with the superpriority status of DIP financing.
However, our evidence also suggests that DIP lenders do not encourage overinvestment or risk-shifting by firms. We find that firms that obtain DIP financing 3 Related work on DIP financing include Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramirez (1997) and John and Vasudevan (1995) . Chatterjee et al. examine the impact of DIP financing announcement in the borrower's market value while John and Vasudevan present a theoretical analysis of the effect of DIP financing on the probability of successful reorganization. 4 The focus on collateral is highlighted by Callas (1990) , Kleiman (1992) and Moore (1990) .
are more likely to emerge successfully from bankruptcy. The results support a larger information-based role for the DIP lenders as screening and monitoring agents.
We next examine the role of prior lending relationships in DIP financing. 5 We find that while many firms receive DIP financing from an existing lender, a significant number obtain it from a lender with whom they have no existing lending relationship.
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There are two main differences between the existing (insider) lender and the new (outsider) lender. The first difference is that an insider has an outstanding debt claim to the firm. The second difference is the amount of private information that insiders have about the firm's future prospects. We use these two features of inside DIP financing to conduct further tests. First, insofar as insiders are also senior creditors to the firm, this would minimize the overinvestment problem (See Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991 and Triantis, 1993) . Hence, if DIP financing does promote overinvestment we should see less overinvestment occurring for firms that are financed by insiders. However, we find no difference in the probability of successful emergence from bankruptcy between inside DIP financed firms and outside DIP financed firms. This is consistent with and supports our earlier result that DIP financing is not merely asset-based financing that encourages overinvestment by firms, but, on average, is information-based and funds positive NPV projects.
The second feature of insiders is that they acquire private information about their borrowers through their loan monitoring activities. This information advantage is likely to be stronger for smaller firms about which there exists less publicly available information. Hence a smaller firm might find it easier to obtain DIP financing from 5 Gilson (1990) documents the active role played by the bank lenders in the firm's reorganization process. 6 The DIP financing by a lender with no prior lending relationship is sometimes referred to as "Pure Debtor-in-Possession financing". 7 An intuitive explanation for mitigation of overinvestment (risk-shifting) is as follows: It is the senior status of the DIP lender that makes her willing to finance risky projects -if the project is successful, every one is paid off while if the project fails, DIP financier, being the senior most lender, is still assured of a pay-off (provided the project chosen does not destroy the value of the firm completely). When existing lenders become DIP lenders, they need to take into account their prior outstanding claims, the value of which would be reduced if the firm undertook risky projects. This mitigates the overinvestment problem.
its existing lenders. This argument is supported by our finding that the smaller firms tend to receive their DIP financing from their existing lenders, while firms with a large asset base often receive DIP financing from new lenders.
Finally, we examine whether DIP financing (inside or outside) is associated with the speed of bankruptcy resolution. If the reorganization process becomes long and drawn out, this can result in a reduced probability of bankruptcy emergence, as well as diminished value of the underlying assets. If DIP financiers are adequately covered then they may not care if and when the f irm emerges from bankruptcy.
However, if DIP lenders are active screening and/or monitoring agents, then we should see DIP financed firms showing faster reorganization periods than if the firm is financed otherwise. We find that this is borne out in the data. Not only are DIP financed firms more likely to emerge successfully from bankruptcy, the time spent in the reorganization period is also shorter than that of the non-DIP financed firms.
Related to this, existing lenders have prior claims on the firm. The value of these claims is more likely to be adversely affected by a prolonged reorganization process than the value of the senior and better-secured DIP loan. Thus, there are incentives for the prior lenders to identify, and facilitate, quicker reorganizations. In such a case we would expect the firms that received DIP financing from one of the existing lenders to have a shorter reorganization period, on average, than the firms that obtained DIP financing from a lender with no prior relationship in the past. Our results show that the reorganization period for firms that get their DIP financing from existing lenders is significantly shorter. Overall, our results support a larger information-based role for DIP financing which is strengthened when it is combined with a prior lending relationship with the firm.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we briefly describe the DIP financing process and certain features of this form of financing. Section 3 describes the main hypotheses and tests. Section 4 provides the details of the data and sample selection. The main results and their interpretations are contained in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
The DIP Financing Process
When the firm files for protection under Chapter 11, the debtor (the e xisting management) retains control over the assets, business operations and the reorganization efforts. However, the debtor must obtain court approval to obtain DIP financing and must execute the necessary loan documents with its DIP lender.
If a prior lender is providing the DIP financing then this usually means adopting and ratifying existing prepetition loan documents as part of the financing order. However, if a lender with whom the debtor has no prior relationship is providing the DIP financing then new loan documents must be executed.
To obtain DIP financing the debtor makes a motion for authorization to obtain credit pursuant to the Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001 (c)(1). This motion is usually filed upon or shortly after the commencement of Chapter 11 and is required to be served upon any official committee and upon the United States trustee.
The court does not commence a final hearing on this motion for at least 15 days.
However, most motions request an interim hearing before the expiration of 15 days.
This hearing authorizes immediate borrowing of a limited amount "only to the extent necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm to the estate pending a final hearing."
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The second and final stage of obtaining DIP financing involves entry of a "permanent" or "final" financing order by the court authorizing the borrowing of the full amount of the lender's commitment.
The security and seniority of the DIP financing is governed by Section 364, which is structured with 4 sections, each with an escalating series of inducements that the debtor may offer to attract credit. We provide a brief description of various subsections (see Epstein, Nickles, and White (1993) 
Testable hypotheses

Characteristics of firms obtaining DIP financing
The unique legal characteristics of DIP financing cause it to differ from standard loan financing. The main difference is that a DIP lender frequently obtains a superpriority status over the borrower's assets for the DIP loan given to a firm reorganizing under Chapter 11. Hence we hypothesize that DIP financing is obtained by firms with large underlying assets that can be offered as possible collateral to a potential DIP financier. It is fairly intuitive that, given its superpriority status, DIP financing would be linked to the asset base of the firm. The more interesting question is whether DIP financing is linked purely to the assets of the firm, and in the process promotes risky investments, or whether it plays a more positive information-based role in h elping the firm invest in positive NPV projects. Examining this question leads to our next hypothesis.
Relationship between DIP lending and bankruptcy outcome
The superpriority status of DIP lenders has been used to support the argument that DIP lenders are mainly concerned with recovering their money in the event of liquidation (see Callas, 1990 and Moore, 1990) , and hence they lend to large firms whose asset liquidation will pay them back (Kleiman, 1992) . However, the question arises whether a DIP financier cares at all about the continued viability of the firm. A large body of literature (see, for example, Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991 and Triantis 1993) argues that the most controversial aspect of DIP financing is the potential for equity holders and the DIP lender to conspire and expropriate wealth from a firm's senior creditors. The incentives of equity holders of a financially-distressed firm to shift into riskier (even negative NPV) projects are well-known. Given her superpriority status, if the DIP financier is fully secured then she may have few incentives to care about whether the firm takes on positive or negative NPV projects.
Thus, a DIP financier who is fully covered by the superpriority on the firm's assets may collude (actively or passively) with equity holders by providing financing for such projects that are not in the interest of the firm's other senior creditors.
The alternate hypothesis is that DIP financiers have a more positive information based role in that they enable the firm to invest in positive NPV projects. If such is the case then the ability to offer secured credit, such as DIP financing, benefits all security holders. We can test which hypothesis holds by examining the final outcome of the reorganization process. If DIP financing allows firms to take on negative NPV projects then we should see a lower incidence of emergence from bankruptcy for DIP financed firms. On the other hand if DIP financing has a broader informational role in assessing the firms' viability and funds firms with positive NPV projects, then we should see a higher incidence of emergence from bankruptcy for DIP-financed firms.
Relationship between DIP lending and speed of bankruptcy resolution
If the reorganization period is drawn out then this can result in (a) reduced probability of emergence, as well as, (b) diminished value of the underlying assets.
If DIP financing is fully secured and more than adequately covered, then DIP financier will not care about whether or when the firm emerges f rom bankruptcy.
However, if such is not the case, then the DIP financier will care about the time to bankruptcy resolution for both the reasons mentioned above. In such a case we expect the DIP financed firms to have a faster time to bankruptcy resolution than non-DIP financed firms. The alternative would be that DIP financing has no role in either screening or facilitating quicker reorganizations.
The role of prior lending relationships in DIP financing
DIP financing can be obtained from two sources: either from an existing (insider) lender or from a new (outsider) lender with whom the borrower has no prior relationship. There are two main differences between insiders and outsiders. First, the insider is likely to be a senior creditor to the firm. Second, the inside bank lender has access to private information about the borrower that it has acquired through past monitoring and information gathering.
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We examine implications of both of these aspects.
Characteristics of firms obtaining inside-DIP financing
The inside DIP financier has private information about the borrower. The extent and nature of this private information would vary depending on the borrower's characteristics. For some borrowers private information may add little to what is publicly known. In these cases inside and outside banks are on equal footing in assessing the future prospects of such firms. However, for some firms the inside banks are likely to have better information than outside financiers. This would be particularly applicable to smaller and more information-sensitive firms whose prospects may be more difficult for a new lender to evaluate. This leads to the testable prediction that inside banks are more likely to fund certain kinds of firms, which are information-sensitive (e.g., small firms). The alternative would be that insiders and outsiders do not differ in the kind of firms that they fund.
Relationship between inside-DIP financing and bankruptcy outcome
An inside bank has prior claims on the borrowing firm. If an inside bank finances negative NPV projects then the value of its existing claims would deteriorate. This minimizes the overinvestment problem. Hence, if DIP financing does promote some overinvestment, or investment in risky projects, such overinvestment is likely to be lower for the firms that obtain DIP financing from their existing borrowers. This in turn would imply firms that obtain DIP financing from prior lenders are more likely to emerge from bankruptcy than firms that obtained DIP financing from an outside lender. However if there is little systematic overinvestment then we should see no differences in the probability of emergence from bankruptcy for inside and outside DIP financing. This provides an additional test of the overinvestment hypothesis for DIP financing.
Relationship between inside-DIP lending and speed of bankruptcy resolution
Since an inside bank has prior claims outstanding, the value of its total claims (prior loans and the DIP loan) is more sensitive to the value of the underlying assets than the value of claims of an outside lender (only the DIP loan). Hence inside banks have an incentive to finance companies that are likely to reorganize faster. Further, an inside lender is more likely to have the private information necessary to identify such firms and to facilitate a faster reorganization of these firms due to the incentives mentioned above. In such a case, we should see inside DIP financed firms being associated with faster reorganizations than financing by outsiders. The alternative would be that the firms obtaining inside-DIP financing have a reorganization period that is not significantly different than that of outside-DIP financed firms.
Data and sample selection
As a starting point for assembling the sample of firms that obtained DIP financing we used the Bankruptcy DataSource from New Generation Research Inc. (NGR).
This database includes financial and reorganization information on major public firms that file for Chapter 11. As a first step we identified all the firms that filed for we identified the industry groups of the debtors by checking its primary SIC code as reported in the bankruptcy filing as well as that reported by the DealScan database.
We also obtained the SIC codes from Compustat but these were used only in the cases where no information was available. This was done to avoid the welldocumented errors in the Compustat industry classification. (see for example Kahle and Walking, 1996 and Guenther and Rosman, 1994) . We excluded the financial services firms such as depository institutions, insurance companies, non-banking financial firms and real estate firms.
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We also excluded the six Chapter 11 filings caused by asbestos and silicon implant litigation as these were largely of a nonfinancial nature and the reorganization processes involved negotiation with a large number of tort claimants. This reduced the sample to 548 firms. The next step was to identify the subset of firms that obtained DIP financing.
We used a two-stage procedure to establish whether a firm received DIP financing. First, we used the Dealscan database from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC), which contains publicly available information on over 50,000 corporate loans booked since 1986. It contains detailed transaction-level information on the size, maturity and the terms (fees, rates) of individual loan deals. The database also provides the name of the lead lender and in some instances the size of the syndicate. The details on the purpose of the loan are contained under the data field primary purpose. We searched this field for the entry "debtor-in-possession," thus enabling us to generate a sample of loans meant primarily for the debtor-in-possession financing. For the 10-year sample period of 1988 to 1997 we were able to obtain a primary sample of 166 DIP credit facilities contracted by 107 firms that filed for Chapter 11 in this period. The number of credit facilities is larger than the number of firms for two reasons. First, the DIP financing to a single borrower can consist of multiple facilities such as term loans and revolvers. Second, some of the firms renew their DIP facilities if the existing facilities mature before the firm is able to exit the Chapter 11 reorganization process.
However, the Dealscan database is not a complete and comprehensive source of all loans. We supplement this list by searching the Dow Jones News Retrieval system and the Lexis-Nexis business news section for the key words "debtor-in-possession financing," "DIP financing" and "post-petition financing" to check for stories involving debtor-in-possession financing. For robustness we also searched the news stories for each firm around the date of its Chapter 11 filing and its SEC filings for any mention of DIP financing. This step allows us to confirm the accuracy of the Dealscan information, and to find additional instances of DIP financing that are not included in the Dealscan database. We were able to confirm the Dealscan DIP financing for 93 of the 107 firms. This search also yielded news stories of DIP financing for 58 firms that were not covered by the Dealscan database. Thus, our final sample consisted of 165 firms that received DIP financing. We found some indication of post-petition financing arrangements for an additional 10 firms but because we could not confirm this information they were excluded from the total sample. This left us with a total sample of 538 Chapter 11 filings, of which 165 received DIP financing.
The data on the financial characteristics of the sample firms is obtained from a variety of sources. Wherever possible we obtained the data for the last fiscal year before the year of filing from Compustat. For the firms that were not covered by
Compustat we obtained the data from the Bankruptcy DataSource. In cases where the data was available from both sources w e used the latest available data. The information on the industry classification of the debtor is taken from the firm's
Chapter 11 filing as reported by Bankruptcy DataSource. The date of the Chapter 11 filing is also taken from Bankruptcy DataSource. In order to estimate the time taken for resolution of reorganization process we used the date of the confirmation of the plan by the bankruptcy court as the final resolution of the reorganization process.
However, a significant number of firms had no formal confirmation date as they either liquidated piecemeal via asset sales or were acquired outright. For these firms we used the date on which a significant asset sale or acquisition was approved by the bankruptcy court as the date of resolution of reorganization process. In a few cases we were able to locate only the date of the filing of a plan of liquidation with the bankruptcy court and we used that date as the end point for reorganization process if no other information was available.
In order to examine the role of the prior (pre-petition) lender in providing DIP financing the identity of both the pre-petition as well as the DIP creditors is required.
These were obtained primarily from the Dealscan database, and were confirmed and supplemented through news stories and SEC filings.
The calendar time distribution of the firms that filed for Chapter 11 and the subset that received DIP financing is illustrated in Table 1 . There is a clustering of filings for the period 1990-1992, a period of economic recession for the US economy. Table   1 also reports the fraction of total filings that received DIP financing for each year, which shows an increasing trend over the sample period. For the first half of the sample period, fewer than 20% percent of the firms filing for Chapter 11 were able to receive DIP financing, while this proportion rises to over 30% for the later half of the sample period, reflecting the growing importance of the DIP market.
Given that only about a third of our sample of firms filing for Chapter 11 obtain DIP financing, are there certain characteristics that make a firm more likely to obtain DIP financing? The unique legal status of DIP loans warrants an examination of their role in the reorganization process. Does the borrower's ability to obtain DIP financing influence the probability of its successful reorganization? What effect does the DIP financing have on the time spent by the borrower in the reorganization process? Finally, are the firms that obtain DIP financing from their existing lenders different than those that obtain DIP financing from a new lender? The tests below are designed to answer these questions.
Methodology and results
In this section we present results that bear on the hypotheses described in section 3. In Table 1 and 2 we report some basic statistics of our sample. Table 3 presents the results of Probit model on the determinants of a firm's ability to obtain DIP financing. In Table 4 we present the relationship between the outcome of a firm's reorganization process and its ability to get DIP financing. Table 5 reports the impact of DIP financing on the time spent in reorganization. The final set of Tables (Tables   6, 7 and 8) provides results on DIP financing and the role of prior lenders. Finally we discuss the robustness of our results to several alternative estimation and specification strategies.
Characteristics of firms obtaining DIP financing
In order to measure the impact of various firm characteristics on the firm's ability to obtain DIP financing, after controlling for other factors, we estimate a Probit regression model of the following form:
The variables are briefly defined below:
DIP: The dependent variable in the model is equal to one if the firm i obtained DIP financing, zero otherwise.
LOGASSET: The natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the last year before the date of filing for Chapter 11.
LEVERAGE: The ratio calculated by dividing the sum of the long-term debt and current liabilities by the total assets.
PREPAK: A dummy variable that takes the value one if the filing was a prepackaged
Chapter 11 filing, zero otherwise.
POST1992: A dummy variable that takes the value one if the Chapter 11 filing took place in the period 1992-1997, zero otherwise.
RETAIL: A dummy variable that takes the value one if the primary SIC code reported in the Chapter 11 filing is in the range 5200-5999.
The impact of the size of the firm's assets on its likelihood to obtain DIP financing is measured by LOGASSET. If collateral is a strong factor in a debtor's ability to get DIP financing then we expect to find a positive coefficient for the LOGASSET. The variable LEVERAGE captures the capital structure of the debtor.
The presence of a large amount of debt compared to the assets would make the debtor less attractive for DIP financing and our model should predict a negative coefficient for LEVERAGE. A prepackaged filing requires the firm to file a plan of reorganization that has been agreed to by all claim classes at the time of filing for Chapter 11. As reported by Tashijian, Lease and McConnell (1996) a prepackaged filing leads to a significantly shorter stay in the reorganization process for the debtor.
A debtor filing for a prepackaged reorganization plan is less likely to need DIP financing due to a shorter anticipated stay in the reorganization process and we expect to find a negative coefficient for the PREPAK variable. We control for the historical growth of DIP financing by including the dummy variable POST1992. Since the DIP financing business has grown rapidly in the last few years, the debtor filing for
Chapter 11 in the later half of the sample period is more likely to get DIP financing.
The retail industry produced a relatively large fraction of high profile DIP financing (Macy's, Federated, Ames and Carter Hawley Hale Stores are some of the examples).
Typically the retail industry has a high level of inventories and accounts receivables that can b e used as collateral in DIP financing. Further, a large number of firms filing for bankruptcy arrange DIP financing in order to reassure trade creditors and customers; this can be quite important in the retail industry. Rohman (1990) and Rizzi (1991) discuss the special attraction of retail firms to DIP lenders. Hence we include a dummy variable for the retail industry in our model specification. filings. This is intuitively appealing as the prepackaged filings are accompanied by a pre-approved plan of reorganization. Thus, in most prepackaged filings the borrower continues to have access to its existing credit lines, which obviates the need to obtain DIP financing. The coefficient for leverage is negative as expected but is not statistically significant. The results of Table 3 are consistent with what we might expect given the superpriority status given to the DIP lenders.
Relationship between DIP financing and bankruptcy outcomes
Our next question is whether DIP lending leads to systematic overinvestment by the borrower as predicted by Bebchuk and Fried (1996) and other critics of secured financing, or whether it plays a positive role by funding firms that undertake positive NPV projects as argued by Schwartz (1997). In particular, do the DIP lenders assess the probability of emergence from bankruptcy for firms that they lend to? If the DIP lending has an information-based role, funding firms with positive NPV projects, then the firms that obtain DIP financing should have a greater probability of emerging from bankruptcy. We use a Probit model to examine whether firms that receive DIP financing are more likely to emerge from bankruptcy. We estimate the Probit model of the following form:
EMERGE, the dependent variable, equals one if the firm i emerged either as an independent entity or was acquired by or merged with another firm. The dependent variable is equal to zero i f the firm converted its filing to Chapter 7, liquidated or there is no news on the firm having emerged. We restrict our sample to those firms that did not file a prepackaged Chapter 11, since a prepackaged filing is almost always accompanied by a plan o f reorganization that has been accepted by all the existing claim classes. This in turn ensures that the firm would emerge (and do so fairly quickly) from its reorganization process. We also exclude the control variable POST1992 as there is no exogenous change in the bankruptcy law during the sample period that predicts that the probability of emergence or the length of the reorganization period should be related to the timing of the Chapter 11 filing, though, as we shall see later in the robustness section, including this variable does not materially affect our results.
Panel A of Table 4 shows the result of the Probit model. As expected, the larger firms are more likely to emerge successfully as the coefficient for LOGASSET is positive and significant. We are interested in the sign of the coefficient for the DIP variable. The results show that it is positive and significant at 10% level. Thus firms that obtain DIP financing are more likely to emerge successfully, consistent with an informational role for DIP financing.
However, we need to take into account some additional issues. From our Probit regression we know that DIP financed firms are marked by certain characteristics such as large asset size. We need to control for these other characteristics. While we have done this by introducing these variables in our regressions as independent variables, some issues remain. In particular, when the independent variable is endogenous and is a function of known characteristics, the coefficients in a linear regression are inconsistent. One way of controlling this would be to form a control group. However, the limitations of forming a control group are well known. Not only is there a problem of subjective criteria, and loss of sample size, there is also the issue of how much one can reduce the matching criteria limits and still have an adequate sample size. Another way of dealing with this issue econometrically is through selectivity methods (see Maddala, 1983; Greene, 1997) . This is the technique that w e adopt in this paper. In order to implement this we use a two-step method. In the first step we estimate a Probit equation with DIP financing as the dependent variable, as in equation (1). We then use the estimates of the Probit equation to form the inverse mills ratio, which we then plug into the second step regression. The second step regression will be the Probit equation as in equation (2) that will have an additional independent variable called DIPLAMDA, which will represent the inverse mills ratio. The Panel B of Table 4 shows the selectivityadjusted results, which are very similar to our previous results. All combined, these results suggest that DIP financing is positively related to the probability of emergence from bankruptcy.
Relationship between DIP financing and speed of bankruptcy resolution
A longer stay in the reorganization process reduces the probability of emerging and may also lead to deterioration of the firm's assets that secure the DIP loan.
14 Hence DIP financiers have incentives to identify and facilitate shorter reorganization periods for firms. To test for this, we estimate an OLS regression of the following form:
RESOLPRD i is the resolution period defined as the number of days from the date of the Chapter 11 filing to the date on which the firm's plan of reorganization is confirmed by the court, or when the court approved a plan of liquidation or a major asset sale. There is no resolution date available for 127 firms and these firms are excluded from the analysis.
Panel A of Table 5 provides the results of this OLS regression. We find that the coefficient for DIP is negative and significant at 10%. Firms with larger assets typically spend more time in Chapter 11. Given the large number of creditors that these firms have and the more complex issues that such firms face, this is a fairly intuitive result. However, larger firms are also more likely to obtain DIP financing.
We are interested in the marginal effect of DIP. We find that DIP lending occurs for firms where the reorganization period is shorter, after taking the size of the firms' assets into account. This is consistent with the argument that DIP lending is not just asset-based but is also information-based. It is also consistent with our earlier result from the Probit that found that firms with a higher probability of emerging from bankruptcy are more likely to obtain DIP financing.
The OLS regression of time to reorganization suggests that firms that spend less time in the reorganization process are more likely to obtain DIP financing. We run a number of robustness checks to take care of some issues in estimation. First, we account for right censoring in the data. In the OLS regression we included only those firms for which we could establish a resolution date as described above. In our sample there are a number of firms for which we do not have a resolution date at the time of our research (June 30, 1999) . For these firms it is reasonable to assume that there is a positive probability that they will emerge from the reorganization process.
Our data is right censored, and we need to take this censoring into account. One way of doing this is to run a censored normal regression taking the upper censoring to be June 30, 1999. This is very similar to a standard Tobit regression that is typically left censored at zero (though the censoring can be at different limits). When we run this regression we find that our results are even stronger. As reported in Panel B of Table   5 , in the full sample the coefficient for DIP is negative and significant at 1%.
Second, we correct the censored regression for selectivity bias since the DIP dummy variable is endogenous. The correction is done by inserting the inverse mills ratio estimated from the Probit as an independent variable into the censored normal 
The role of prior lending relationships in DIP financing
Another important issue is the source of DIP financing. The debtor can choose to obtain this financing either from its existing lenders or from a lender with whom it has no past relationship. In general, existing lenders are likely to have better information about their borrower than outsiders or a new lender (see, e.g., James, 1987 , Puri, 1999 . Also the existing lender providing DIP financing is likely to be a senior lender such as the bank. We examine the implications of both these factors below.
Characteristics of firms obtaining inside-DIP financing
The existing lender is likely to have better information about its borrower than an outside lender, through information collected through its loan monitoring activities.
Such information advantages are likely to be stronger for smaller firms with less publicly available information. Hence one may expect that the insider lender would tend to finance smaller (more informational sensitive) firms where it enjoys a larger information advantage compared to an outside lender.
To test whether inside DIP lenders finance different kinds of firms than outside DIP lenders, we run a Probit model with the dependent variable equal to zero if the DIP financing is provided by the firm's prepetition lender and zero if it is provided by a new lender. The results are reported in Table 6 . The coefficient for LOGASSET is negative and significant at 10%. Insofar as smaller borrowers are more likely to obtain financing from existing lenders, this is consistent with information advantages of being a prior lender. Interestingly, prepackaged filings that receive DIP financing are likely to receive it from their existing lenders. This result is not surprising given that the prepackaged filings are characterized by a concurrent filing of a plan of reorganization that is already approved by the existing creditors. The results suggest that insiders lend more frequently to small firms where they are at an informational advantage. As prior lenders they are also more likely to finance prepackaged filings.
These results emphasize the difference between obtaining DIP financing from insiders, with whom the firm has prior relationships, versus outside lenders.
Relationship between inside-DIP financing and bankruptcy outcome
If DIP financing promotes systematic overinvestment, and if existing lenders provide DIP financing, then the incentives to overinvest would be significantly lower (Triantis, 1993) for such firms. In such a case, we would expect to see the insiderfinanced firms to have a higher probability of emerging successfully from the reorganization process. To test this hypothesis we run a Probit model specification of the following form:
SAME is equal to one if the DIP financing was provided by the existing lender and zero otherwise. The results reported in Panel A of Table 7 shows that the coefficient for the dummy variable SAME is negative but not significant. We also estimate the Probit by adjusting for selectivity bias and the results are largely unchanged. Thus, the identity of the DIP financier does not affect the final outcome of the reorganization significantly. This provides further evidence that DIP financing is not associated with significant overinvestment.
Relationship between inside-DIP and speed of bankruptcy resolution
We now test the relationship between the identity of the DIP financier and the time the borrower spends in the reorganization process. We estimate the OLS and censored normal regression for the dependent variable RESOLPRD for the sample of firms that received DIP financing and did not file a prepackaged Chapter 11. We test for the impact of the lender's identity by including the dummy variable SAME as an independent variable. Our results reported i n Table 8 provide strong support for the assertion that the firms that obtain DIP financing from their existing lenders tend to resolve their Chapter 11 filing in a significantly shorter time period than the firms that obtain DIP financing from a new lender. Again, we conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we correct for the right censoring of data through a censored normal regression. As can be seen from the results reported in Panel B of Table 8 Table   8 and show a similar picture to our previous results. The results suggest that insiders are able to identify and facilitate shorter reorganization periods. The results suggest that the positive informational role of DIP financing is strengthened when combined with a prior lending relationship with the firm.
Robustness Checks
In this section we conduct some additional robustness checks. The first issue we explore is the role played by the d egree of complexity of capital structure in the reorganization process of the firm. Gilson et al. (1990) document a positive relationship between simplicity of capital structure and firm's ability to reorganize privately. We collect data on the creditor classes in bankruptcy. This information is available for about 50% of the firms in our sample. We reestimate a specification in which we include the number of creditor classes as an independent variable. The results are very similar to those reported in Table 3 through 8.
Second, in our tests of the relationship between DIP financing (identity of the DIP lender) and the firm's reorganization process we presented results for the subsample of firms that did not file a prepackaged Chapter 11. This was done to eliminate the well-documented (Tashijian et al. 1996) findings that prepackaged filing always lead to successful emergence of the filing firm. Since a creditor-approved plan of reorganization is a key feature of a prepackaged filing, the time spent in reorganization is significantly short for such filings. We reestimated our results for the entire sample (prepackaged and non-prepackaged filings) and included a dummy variable for prepackaged filings (which were reported in Tables in earlier versions of this paper). The results are very similar to those reported in Table 4 and 5 (Table 7 and 8 for the identity of DIP lender tests).
Finally, in the Probits estimating the likelihood of emergence from bankruptcy, we had excluded the POST1992 dummy as a control variable because we felt there was no significant change in the bankruptcy law or economic reason to include this as a control. However, insofar, as there is a growth in DIP financing in the POST1992 period, one might argue that there is a case for inclusion of such a dummy.
Accordingly, we reestimate our Probits including the POST1992 dummy as a control variable. The results are very similar.
Conclusion
Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing is an important and unique form of financing available to firms that have filed for bankruptcy under the U.S. Bankruptcy code. While this form of financing has assumed increasing importance in the reorganization process of financially distressed companies, there has been little empirical research investigating DIP financing. There is a large debate in the law and economics literature focusing on the efficiency characteristics of DIP financing.
One point of view argues that allowing borrowing on terms of superior priority and security, such as DIP financing a dversely, affects the claims of the firms' past creditors as it allows the firm to invest in risky (possibly negative NPV) projects. The alternative view is that DIP financing has a more positive role, benefiting all stakeholders by allowing the firm to undertake positive NPV projects.
We collect a large sample of firms that filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and test which of the underlying theories are supported in the data. Our evidence suggests that the DIP financing is not related to systematic overinvestment. On the contrary, firms that received DIP financing are more likely to successfully reorganize than those that did not obtain DIP financing. Further we examine the reorganization outcomes of the firms that received DIP financing from their existing lenders and of the firms that obtained DIP financing from a new lender. If DIP financing is associated with systematic overinvestment, then we should see less overinvestment for firms that receive DIP financing from their prior lenders. Our findings show no significant difference between the final reorganization outcomes for the insider-DIP financed firms and outsider-DIP financed firms. These results provide further evidence against overinvestment or risk-shifting caused by DIP financing, and are consistent with a more positive informational role of DIP financing.
We next examine the role of prior lending relationships in DIP financing. Inside-DIP lenders differ from outside-DIP lenders on two counts: Insiders are likely to have more private information about the firm, and insiders also have an outstanding debt claim with the firm. We examine the implications of these features by conducting further tests on DIP financing and the role of prior lenders. We find that smaller firms tend to obtain DIP financing from their existing lenders. This is consistent with the view that the private information that insiders have about these firms give them a comparative advantage in providing DIP financing to these smaller, more information-sensitive firms.
We also examine whether DIP financing (inside or outside) is associated with the time spent in the Chapter 11 reorganization process. We find that DIP financing is significantly associated with firms with shorter reorganization periods. The period of reorganization is significantly shorter for firms that obtain DIP financing from their existing borrowers. Overall, our evidence supports a larger positive informationbased role of DIP financing, which is strengthened by the existence of a prior lending relationship with the firm. Table 3 Determinants of DIP Financing
The Table below presents the results of Probit regressions. The Probit model dependent variable is 1 if the firm filing for Chapter 11 received DIP financing and 0 otherwise. LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the latest year before the f irm's filing for Chapter 11. LEVERAGE is the ratio of sum of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by book value of total assets. RETAIL is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's primary SIC code is between 5200 and 5999. PREPAK is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm filed a prepackaged Chapter 11. POST1992 is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the filing took place in the second half of the sample period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) Table below presents the results of OLS regression. The dependent variable is the length of the resolution period for the Chapter 11 filing firm defined as the number of days from the date of Chapter 11 filing to the date of the resolution of its reorganization process. The filings for which no resolution date is available are excluded from the analysis. Prepackaged bankruptcies are also excluded. LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the latest year before the firm's filing for Chapter 11. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total book value of liabilities divided by book value of total assets. RETAIL is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's primary SIC code is between 5200 and 5999. DIP is 1 if the firm received DIP financing and 0 otherwise. Panel B: Censored normal regression The model being estimated is similar to the one in Panel A but now includes the firms for which no resolution date is available. Thus the reorganization process for these firms is taken to be right censored as of 6/30/99. Panel C: Censored normal regression estimates after adjusting for selectivity bias The model being estimated is the same as the one in Panel B with the independent variable DIP being replaced by DIPLAMDA, which is the inverse mills ratio formed using estimates obtained from the Probit regression in Table 3 .
Panel D: Censored normal regression estimates (adjusted for selectivity bias, excluding unsuccessful outcomes) The model being estimated is the same as the one in Panel C however the sample does not include the filings resulting in liquidation, substantial asset sales or conversion to Chapter 7. Table 6 Determinants of Inside DIP Financing
Coefficient T-ratio
The Table below presents the results of Probit regressions. The Probit model dependent variable is 1 if the firm received DIP financing from one of its prior lenders and 0 otherwise. LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the latest year before the firm's filing for Chapter 11. LEVERAGE is the ratio of sum of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by book value of total assets. RETAIL is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's primary SIC code is between 5200 and 5999. PREPAK is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm filed a prepackaged Chapter 11. POST1992 is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the filing took place in the second half of the sample period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) Table presents the results of Probit regressions. The dependent variable is 1 if the firm filing for Chapter 11 either emerged as an independent firm or was acquired or merged with another firm and is equal to 0 if the firm's filing was converted to Chapter 7, or it was liquidated or there is no information available. Prepackaged bankruptcies are excluded. LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the latest year before the firm's filing for Chapter 11. LEVERAGE is the ratio of sum of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by book value of total assets. RETAIL is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's primary SIC code is between 5200 and 5999. SAME is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm obtained DIP financing from one of its prepetion creditors and 0 otherwise.
Panel B: Estimates after adjusting for selectivity bias The model estimated as is similar to the one in Panel A with SAME variable being replaced by SAMELAMDA, which is the inverse mills ratio formed using estimates obtained from the Probit regression in Table below presents the results of OLS regression. The dependent variable is the length of the resolution period for the Chapter 11 filing firm defined as the number of days from the date of Chapter 11 filing to the date of the resolution of its reorganization process. Prepackaged bankruptcies are excluded. The filings for which no resolution date is available are excluded from the analysis. LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the latest year before the firm's filing for Chapter 11. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total book value of liabilities divided by book value of total assets. RETAIL is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's primary SIC code is between 5200 and 5999. SAME is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm obtained DIP financing from one of its prepetion creditors and 0 otherwise. Panel B: Censored normal regression The model being estimated is similar to the one in Panel A but now includes the firms for which no resolution date is available. Thus the reorganization process for these firms is taken to be right censored as of 6/30/99. Panel C: Censored normal regression estimates after adjusting for selectivity bias The model being estimated is the same as the one in Panel B with the independent variable SAME being replaced by SAMELAMDA, which is the inverse mills ratio formed using estimates obtained from the Probit regression in Table 6 .
Panel D: Censored normal regression estimates (adjusted for selectivity bias, excluding unsuccessful outcomes) The model being estimated is the same as the one in Panel C however the sample does not include the filings resulting in liquidation, substantial asset sales or conversion to Chapter 7. 
